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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 16462

EUGENE L. ANDERSON and
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Repondent.

REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff-appellant Sugarhouse Finance Company replies
to the brief of respondents:
POINT I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF
CONSIDERATION AND MEETING OF THE MINDS.
Respondents in their brief acknowledge the rule pertaining to accord and satisfaction that "an agreement by a
creditor to accept part payment of the liquidated debt as payment in full does not discharge the whole debt unless it is
supported by a new and additional consideration."
Respondent, page 5.)

(Brief of

Respondents rely upon FMA Financial Corp.

v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) and Tates,
Inc. v Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975),
to support their contention that the acknowledged rule should
not be applied to the facts of this case.

The contention is

not supported by the cases cited nor the facts of this case.
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First, this court in both FMA and Tates held that
there was not an accord and satisfaction.

In

~,

this Court

reversed the trial court's finding of accord and satisfaction.
Second, the particular facts of each case may be considered,
but new consideration for an agreement to accept a lesser
amount must be found.

In FMA this Court stated:

Courts are generally somewhat indulgent toward findi~
consideration somewhere in the new arrangement, such
as that it was to settle a dispute, or that there is
some advantage to the creditor in accepting a lesser
Amount, where the unreasoning adherence to the rule
might result in inequity.
(Footnote omitted.)
In Tates, Inc., this Court stated:
The proposition upon which the claimed accord and
satisfaction appears to rest is that under the total
circumstances described above, the plaintiff either
knew, or should be deemed to have known, that the
check was being offered in full satisfaction of the
debt. But such a supposition is not sufficient to
meet the requirements of the rules set forth in the
authorities hereinabove referred to: that to bind the
plaintiff to a new contract, it must be made to appeu
that it was clearly so understood and agreed.
(Foot·
note omitted.)
There is no new consideration between Andersons and Sugarhouse
Finance Company.
Third, there must be a meeting of the minds of the
parties.

Eugene Anderson failed to disclose that he owned cer-

tain real property, the sale of which was eminent, from which
he would receive $2,000 cash and retain a portion of the property.

The judgment lien of Sugarhouse Finance Company was ~e

only lien upon the property.

Because Anderson failed to dis-

close this information, there could be no meeting of the minds
of the parties.

Anderson's purpose in traveling to Salt Lake
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City was to discuss the judgment with Sugarhouse's president
and, based upon his financial condition, to settle the judgment by paying a lesser amount.

The financial condition of the

Andersons was considered by Sugarhouse's president, but Anderson did not disclose the ownership of the property, its impending sale, nor the amount to be received by Anderson from the
sale.

The mutual basis of Anderson requesting, and Sugarhouse

considering, a settlement of the judgment was the Andersons'
financial condition.

For there to be a meeting of the minds,

in these circumstances, required Anderson to disclose to Sugarhouse the property and status of the transaction for its sale.
Assuming, for purpose of argument only, that the
Andersons' agreement or promise to pay $2,200 as full payment
and satisfaction of the judgment was adequate consideration to
support an agreement with Sugarhouse, in view of the Andersons'
other indebtedness, it does not follow that the Andersons'
ownership of the property and the inuninence of its sale can be
disregarded.

Respondents rely on their financial circum-

stances, and their agreement in view of those circumstances to
pay $2,200, as the basis for a claim of new consideration.

The

very heart of the argument is that the financial circumstance
is the basis for finding consideration.

This underscores the

importance and requirement of Andersons disclosing their full
circumstances, particularly the ownership of property and its
anticipated sale.
The trial Court's findings clearly show that the
plaintiff was not aware of all of the pertinent facts:
(3) provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6. At the time the defendant was served with
supplemental order referred to in paragraph 2 hereof
defendant was anticipating the closing of a sale of '
real property in which he had a one-half interest asa
tenant-in-common, and from which defendant Eugene L.
Anderson was to receive $2,000 after payment of the
underlying indebtedness.
7. Eugene L. Anderson knew that plaintiff's
judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien upon all
real property belonging to defendants or in which they
had an interest in Sevier County.
8. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disc~"'
to president of plaintiff the fact that he had an interest in the property, that the property had been
sold, and that he was anticipating the closing of the
sale of property and that defendant Eugene L. AnderMn
was to receive the sum of $2,000 from the sale thereof.,
9. Defendants have no other judgments against
them which are docketed as judgment liens against real•
property owned by them in the County of Sevier, Utah.
In view of (1) plaintiff's judgment, (2) the supplemental order of the Court which required Eugene

L.

Anderson to

appear and answer concerning his property, (3) Anderson's
ownership of property, (4) the anticipated sale of the property, (5) the anticipated net proceeds from the sale, (6)
plaintiff's judgment lien against the property, and (7) the
absence of any other judgment lien against the property, the
ownership of property by the Andersons and the pending sale
thereof cannot be dismissed or disregarded as insignificant.
Rather, the plaintiff was entitled to consider the Anderson's
settlement proposal based on all of the material and relevant
facts, not just those which Eugene L. Anderson wanted to divulge.

If plaintiff, with knowledge of all pertinent and rel~

vant facts, then decided to accept the settlement proposal, the
Andersons might have an arguable position.
(4)

However, in abnn~
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of such a state of facts, Sugarhouse was not obligated to proceed with the settlement agreement.
The facts of this case do not warrant a finding of
consideration.

Further, there could be no binding agreement

because there was no meeting of the minds of the parties as to
the terms of the agreement.

Rather, to so find would work a

gross inequity against Sugarhouse which was given a state of
facts by Anderson and relied thereon, when the facts were false
or incomplete.
POINT II. THE ALLEGED ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS NOT
ENTERED INTO FAIRLY AND HONESTLY; SUGARHOUSE WAS ENTITLED
TO RESCIND UPON DISCOVERY OF THE FACTS.
The general rule of the obligation of fairness between
the parties is stated as follows:
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfaction must have been consummated fairly and honestly;
if procured by fraud, misrepresentation, duress, imposition, overreaching, coercion or compulsion, it is
voidable at the option and instance of the aggrieved
party, and may be rescinded upon discovery of the
facts, provided the aggrieved party acts promptly. 1
Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Section 24.
There can be no question that Sugarhouse Finance Company acted
promptly.

The facts show that upon receiving information re-

garding the true state of affairs, the president of Sugarhouse
Finance Company put the Anderson check in the mail and notified
·Eugene L. Anderson of that action and the rejection of any
agreement on the same day.

Those actions took place within two

days of the conversation between Anderson and Sugarhouse's
president.

(5)
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As discussed in Point I, above, Eugene Anderson did
not disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that he owned property and
that he anticipated its sale, from which he would receive
$2,000.
CONCLUSION
There can be no finding of accord and satisfaction
because (1) the payment of part of a debt does not discharge
it, even if the judgment creditor agrees that it will do so,
and (2) a contract of accord and satisfaction must have been
consununated fairly and honestly; if procured by fraud or misrepresentation, it is voidable at the option and instance of the
aggrieved party and may be rescinded upon discovery of the
facts.

Where one party has superior means of ascertaining the

facts relating to a settlement agreement and fails to disclose
the true state of affairs to the other party, the lack of disclosure may be attributed as fraud and may constitute a basis
for invalidating a compromise settlement.

The undisputed facts

of this case require reversal of the trial court.
DATED this

day of

Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By
Wayne G. Petty
Attorney for Plaintiff
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah
(6)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

the~~

day of March, 1980, I

served a copy of the attached Reply Brief by mailing two copies
thereof in a securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the following at the addresses indicated which are the last addresses
known to me:

H. Ralph Klemm, Esq.
510 Ten Broadway Building
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